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1. SUMMARY: Both parties in a patent infringement suit 
begun in e challenge aspects of the final judgment as to the 
scope of the patent and the award of damages. 
2. FACTS: The patent involved is a process of working 
metal using phosphate, soap, and borax. This process improves 
the lubricity of the metal during the shaping process and the 
cleanability of the metal after its formation. The issues of the 
validity and infringement themselves have a lengthy procedural 
history, which includes two denials of cert from this Court. 
Only issues involving accounting are before the Court at this 
time. 
~ 
The DC assigned the accounting to a Special Master. After a 
53-day-hearing, he issued his report. The Special Master held ----
that accused practices which involved the use of borax-based 
lubricants in cold-forming bumpers and non-bumpers infringed the 
patent, if the use of those lubricants led to cleanability in 
conjunction with lubricity and where GM used those advantages. 
He also ruled that the patent was infringed when certain 
chemcials were substituted for borax. He held that practices 
which do not involve cleaning did not infringe the patent. 
Similarly, he held processed in which borax was used solely to 
neutralize acid and not to lubricate or aid in cleaning did not 
infringe the patent. He refused to award damages for non-bumper 
infringements, because alternatives were availalbe to GM that 
would not have been infringing. 
Noting that plaintiffs were not themselves the 
manufacturers, he held that damages would take the form of a 
' - --3-
reasonable royalty ascertained by reference to hypothetical 
,negotiations. He accepted a figure of .75% as an opening offer, 
but ultimately reduced the figure to .50%. He awarded interest 
as a matter of fact, as part of the hypothetical bargain. 
The DC adopted most of these findings. However, rather than 
ruling that none of the accused rinse practices infringed the 
patent, it ruled that rinse practices which involve cleaning do 
infringe the patent. It rejected the reduction in the reasonable 
royalty rate and restored the .75% figure. 
3. PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The CA affirmed, basing its 
affirmance on many of the findings based on its earlier opinions 
in the case. It agreed with the DC that rinses in which 
cleanability and its effects are put to use in the actual process 
did infringe the patent. It agreed that the patent was useful 
but not essential in the cold forming of bumpers. Thus 
plaintiffs' contention that its damages should be based on the 
cost of producing bumpers by hot forging or contour polishing is 
not reasonable because it assumes that GM could not efficiently 
cold form bumpers without use of the patent. 
There was evidence in the record to support the figure of 
.75%. The facts establish that the patent was relatively 
unimportant in non-bumper cold forming. Thus, the court below 
was correct not to award damages for those processes. 
Under the facts of this case, the_:'-ward of int~ est was not 
error. Although 35 u.s.c. §284 does not make clear when 
interest, if awarded, shall be calculated, both the language of 
the statute and Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 
- --4-
U.S. 476 (1976), support the award of interest from the date of 
infringement here. As amended in 1946, the statute permits a 
court to award "such costs, and interest, as may be fixed by the 
court." Aro quoted a House Report that stated that the object of 
that statutory language was to give "not less than a reasonable 
royalty, together with interest from the time infringement 
occurred. II Not to award interest here would be to give the 
defendant a windfall in the form of the use of the royalty money 
it should have paid to plaintiffs. The result is consistent with 
that in most other cases, although Wahl v. Carrier Manufacturing 
Co., 511 F.2d 209 (CA 7 1975), did rule that "interest should run 
from the date damages are liquidated." Other cases state the 
court has discretion regarding the date from which interest 
begins to run. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood 
Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (CA 2), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 879 (1971); Milgo Electronic Corp. v. United Business 
Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645 (CA 10), cert. denied, 447 
U.S. 982 (1980). 
v 
4. CONTENTIONS: In No. 81-1661, GM challenges the award of 
interest when there has been no finding of bad faith, the DC's 
rejection of the royalty the Special Master determined to be 
reasonable, and the alleged expansion of the claim to included 
process that do not use the vitalizing ingredient, not shown to 
have the same coalition, and not producing ~ e same result. 
Prior to the revision of the statute, prejudgment interest 
had been awarded on unliquidated reasonable royalty damages only 
where there was a finding that the infringer had acted in bad 
.., - -
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faith. Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448 
(1936). There is a now a split in the circuits as to whether the 
revision changed the law on prejudgment interest. Unlike the 
court here and possibly CA 4, see Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell 
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 386 F.2a 287 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
1030, other circuits require findings of "special circumstances" 
based on reckless or bad faith conduct of the infringer before 
the court is permitted to exercise its discretion and award 
prejudgment interest on unliquidated reasonable royalty damages. 
See Ellipse Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 614 F.2a 775 (CA 7 1979): 
Russell Box Co. v. Grant Paper Box Co., 203 F.2a 177 (CA 1 1953), 
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 905: Wm. 
Bros. Boiler & Mfg. Co. v. Gibson-Stewart Co., 312 F.2a 385 (CA 6 
1953): Radiator Specialty Co. v. Micek, 395 F.2d 763 (CA 9 1968). 
The circuits are also split on the meaning of the language from 
the House Report quoted in Aro. CA 2, CA 6, CA 7 and CA 10 have 
concluded that the quotation was inadvertently taken from 
language in an earlier version of the bill, language which was 
objected to and deleted from the statute and is not a controlling 
holding by this Court. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. 
Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (CA 2 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 870): Wm. Bros. Boiler & Mfg. Co., supra, Wahl 
v. Carrier Mfg. Co., Inc., 511 F.2d 209 (CA 7 1975): Maloney-
Crawford Tank Corp. v. Sauder Tank Co., Inc., 511 F.2d 10 (CA 10 
19 7 5) • 
The Special Master here followed the approach of CA 2 in 




in reducing what would be an exhorbitant initial license offer to 
what would be reasonably expected at the end of bargaining. The 
refusal of CA 3 here to follow that approach and instead to 
accept the initial figure produces a conflict between the 
circuits. 
CA 3's treatment of equivalents goes so far as to undermine 
the statutory requirement that patent claims point out and 
particularly claim the invention. In upholding the validity of 
the claim, CA 7 stressed the borax coaction, but CA 3 here 
permitted recovery for other processes. This Court must rule 
that judicial interpretation and application of patent claims 
comply with the statutory language. 
Devex answers that this is the third time GM has asked the 
Court to review its question pertaining to the 35 U.S.C. §112 
requirement that a patent "particularly point out and distinctly 
claim" the inventions. GM misstates the findings of the courts 
below to support its argument. The record fully supports the 
.75% figure. Indeed, when the patent holder in 1964 offered to 
license the industry at this rate, the offer was one depressed by 
GM and open industry infringement. The Special Master's one-
third reduction, in contrast, was based on nothing more than pure 
speculation. The process saved GM $1.53 per bumper. 
GM has not shown a clear abuse of discretion under all the 
facts of the case in the award of pre-judgment interest. The 
statutory history, as explained in Aro, supports the timing of 
the award. It is necessary to give adequate compensation. 
District courts in all the circuits that have spoken since Aro 
'I - -
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have ruled that pre-judgment interest on a reasonable royalty 
award is appropriate to compensate the patent holder adequately 
(citing district court cases). Only CA 7 in Wahl requires that 
the DC find special circumstances to make such an award. Even CA 
7 has recently permitted pre-judgment interest in a different 
act, a Death Act, calling for "fair and just compensation," in 
order to compensate adquately. As the CA in this case pointed 
out, 
"Where, as here, the interest is as much or more 
than the royalties, a failure to award interest 
form the date of the infringement would mean that 
the losing defendant actually gains from the 
infringement and the lengthy litigation." 
Defendant here had the benefit of the reasonable royalties 
wrongfully withheld since 1952, some thirty years ago. It is 
likely that CA 7's requirement of special circumstances could be 
met here. There is not a sharp conflict on the exercise of such 
discretion. 
In No. 81-1865 (cross-petition), Devex asserts that the 
award should have taken account of "savings and gains" in 
establishing the royalty. It also asserts the one accused 
process was erroneously found not to be infringing. The courts 
below departed from the established rule of Tilghman v. Proctor, 
125 U.S. 136 (1888); Gordon Form Lathe Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 133 
F.2d 487 (CA 6 1943), in refusing to consider savings. 
GM replies that these assertions depend on facts which have 
no support in the record. 
In No. 81-1718, Devex challenges the failure to award 
compensation for infringement of non-bumper parts. GM gained an 
°' '. - --8-
advantage from using the patented process and it flies in the 
face of the statute not to compensate for such wrongful use. 
GM replies that no "savings and gains" can be relevant to 
the reasonable royalty unless they are attributable to the 
patented process and relate to comparable noninfringing 
alternatives. The courts below properly found these criteria not 
to be met here. 
5. DISCUSSION: Most of the issues raised are fact-spe~ific trz 
and thus not appropriate for this Court's review. The one 
possible exception is the alleged conflict on pre-j1=3gment 
interest. CA 3 itself recognized that the result in this case .,.....____ 
was inconsistent with CA 7 in Wahl. As described by GM, the 
circuits do disagree about the effect of Aro's citation of 
language from the Committee Report. This Court, however, has 
already denied cert on a case rejecting Aro's reading of the 
statutory language. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-
Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (CA 2), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 870 (1971). Given the unusual and lengthy history of this 
case, as well as the latitude afforded trial courts in assessing 
damages in patent infringment actions, I do not think the award 
of interest was an abuse of discretion and would recommend 
denial. 
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On the prejudgment issue argument, pe 's supposed 
conflict is founded on the argument that the A3 here thought 
prejudgment interest is mandatory is these pe of cases. This 
theory does not conform completely with th language of the CA3 
opinion: "We •.. hold that under the cts of this case the 
award of interest as the yearly royalty ayments became due was 
not an abuse of discretion." App. 335 (emphasis added). Other 
portions of the opinion do tend towar a more mandatory tone, 
however, and at one point the CA3 st es that its resolution is 
"inconsistent" with a CA7 case. Se id. at 336a-339a. Given the 
narrowness of the issue -- availab' ity of prejudgment interest 
under 35 U.S.C. §284 -- I recomme that the Court await a more 
severe conflict before devoting is resources to this problem. 
The memo author correct y notes that all other issues I 
rely heavily on factual interpr tations of an ancient record (the 
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comments on thi 5"" case stated, the CAJ in tn1s case 
one point label its holding as "inconsistent" with the CA7 
case that BRW mentions. And the holding below is in indi-
rect conflict with a number of other decisions, as BRW also 
observes. 
I nevertheless continue to believe that cert is not 
warranted in this case . The Court's increasingly crowded 
docket means that some cases that would have been heard pre-
viously must now be passed over -- unless the lag in this 
Court's docket is simply to continue to grow. Given that 
some cases must lose out, this one exemplifies the type that 
should. The issue of the availability of prejudgment inter-
est under 35 u.s.c. §284 is a very narrow question. The 
conflict is not hopelessly irreconcilable, because the CA3 
did award prejudgment interest "under the facts of this 
case" rather than on an utterly automatic basis -- as the 
petr claims. And this suit has been going for more than 25 
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t,,t-N ~ ~ -1661, 81-1718, 81-1865: ~ /4--U ~ 
~ General Motors Corporation v. Devex 
Justice White, dissenting from denial of certiorari in No. 
81-1661. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
recognized that its decision to award prejudgment interest for 
patent infringement under 35 u.s.c. §284 without a finding of 
special circumstances conflicts di~ with the holding of the 
-.::--
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Wahl v. Carrier 
Manufacturing Co., 511 F.2d 209 (1975). Its approach also 
conflicts with that announced in Radiator Specialty Co. v. Micek, 
395 F.2d 763 (CA9 1968): Wm. Bros. Boiler & Mfg. Co. v. Gibson-
Stewart Co., 312 F.2d 763 (CA6 1953): Russell Box Co. v. Grant 
Paper Box Co., 203 F.2d 177 (CAl 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 
821, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 905. Moreover, its reading of 
.. ' 
'"" - -
language in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top. Co., 377 
U.S. 476 {1976), is inconsistent with that of other circuits. 
See Wahl, supra, Wm. Bros. Boiler & Mfg. Co., supra, Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 {CA2 
1975), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870; Maloney-Crawford Tank Corp. v. 
Sauder Tank Co. , Inc. , 511 F. 2d 10 {CAl0 19 7 5) . Because it is 
this Court's duty to resolve conflicts among the circuits, I 
respectfully dissent from denial of certiorari. 
' -Court ................... . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . 
Submitted ............... . , 19 .. . 
Burger, Ch. J ........ .. . 
HOLD 
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Brennan, J .............. , ..... . 
White, J ............... . , ..... . 
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Powell, J .............. . , ..... . 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: GMC v. Devex Corp., No. 81-1661 
Question Presented 
Does 35 u.s.c. §284 require the award of prejudgment interest 
on unliquidated, reasonable royalty patent infringement damages 
where there has been no finding of bad faith or other exceptional 
circumstances against the infringer but rather a finding (approved 
by the court below) that the infringer "acted in good faith and not 
recklessly"? 
• 
- - 2. 
Background ( ~) 
Resp brought a patent infringement suit. It is settled that C:./t,1 
petr infringed resps' patent. Section 284 of title 35 provides i~~ 
-- ,,..,,....___~ ~ 
relevant part: "Upon finding for the claimant the court ~ l award 
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, 
but in no even less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of 
the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as -
fixed by the court." The Master found that "(t]he only rational way ------=--------
to determine reasonable royalties is by reference to the 
hypothetical negotiations." He found, further, "as a matter of 
fact" that "the results" of such 
have been an agreement providing 
hypothetical negotiations would 
for periodi~~s based on a 
~ 
percentage of petr's sales of infringing bumpers. To this would 
have been added "interest to the patentee to compensate for the 
postponed enjoyment of the pecuniary benefits of the invention." 
Referring to that combination of principal and interest the Master ~/4 
I~ \!'-
stated: "I find that to be the measure of the reasonable royalty due -· _.-,,,,,- ---- -
from defendant on account in the infringement." Resps' expert 
testified to the periodic payments as part of the hypothetical 
license. Petr offered no contrary testimony and did not take 
exception to the Master's finding of fact that the reasonable 
royalty here had to include compensation for delay in payment. Petr 
did argue that the license might not itself contain an express 
interest provision, but this is immaterial because, as the Master 
found, and petr did not challenge, "where the contractual breach 
consists of a failure to pay a fixed or ascertainable monetary 
value ... interest is recoverable from the date payment is due"; and 
- - 3 • 
specifically i n the case of an agreed patent royalty interest runs 
from the date of nonpayment. 
Even though he included delay compensation as an integral part 
of the reasonable royalty, the Master also stated that he: 
L,, .-.,_. 
would rule both as a matter of law and of discretion that 
interest should run from the date of infringement without 
regard to whether defendant's behavior warranted multiple 
damages or attorneys' fees. Any other result would 
frustrate the compensatory purpose of §284 and would be 
inconsistent with the result in other legal settings which 
are virtually indistinguishable. 
~ 
 
The M~ r set forth four considerations in support of his ~ 
conclusion: e that patentees receiving actual or established 
royalties get prejudgment interest and that to deny plaintiffs such 
interest would put them in a worse position "for no discernable 
reason," concluding that "[s]uch apparent arbitrariness of treatment 
is unfair and makes no sense": ((iiT)that 35 U.S.C. 284 should yield 
a result consistent with that u~ 28 U.S.C. §1498 which, even in 
the absence of any express provision for interest, has long been 
judicially interpreted to call for pre-judgment interest so as to 
make the compensation "entire," see ~ ite v. United States, 282 U.S. 
508, 509 (1931):~ that prejudgment interest "is more consistent 
with the contrac~ tionale of a 'reasonable royalty' than would 
be a rule disallowing such interest": an ~ hat the compensatory 
purpose of §284 is not well-served by a rule that would deny 
prejudgment interest, except where the deft has acted wilfully or in 
bad faith, from the mid-1950's to now. 
The DC affirmed the Master's award of prejudgment interest on 
the royalty award, stating that petr must be charged a premium for 
the additional benefit it has enjoyed from retaining the use of the 
• 
- - 4 • 
royalty money over the many years since its first infringement. The 
DC found that, to do otherwise would systematically undercompensate 
patentees and encourage their intfringers to continue fighting 
lawsuits long after the disappearance of any justification for doing 
so for the sole purpose of gathering in generous interest money that 
rightfully belongs to someone else. 
The ~ affirmed, holding "that under the facts of this case 
the award of interest as the yearly royalty payments became due was 
not an abuse of discretion." The CA affirmed that interest here was 
a necessary element in the reasonable royalty for the patent holder. 
The CA cited Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., 377 U.S.476, 505-506 (1964), which held that" [t]he object of 
the [1946 Amendment of 35 U.S.C. §284 was to award] general damages, 
that is, any damages the complainant can prove, not less than a 
reasonable royalty, together with interest from the time 
infringement occurred, rather than profits and damages." (quoting 
H. R. Rep. No. 1587, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946)). The CA then 
stated that "in a case such as this one, 35 U.S.C. 284 itself 
suppor t s the award of interest from the date of infringement," 
because it requires that the damages be "adequate to compensate for 
the infringement." The CA noted that the complaint was filed in 
1956 and that interest was awarded "for infringement which took 
place i n that year": failure to award such interest would be to 
"give defendant a windfall in the form of the use of the royalty 
money i t should have paid to plaintiffs, and would deprive 
plaint i ffs of money they should have had." Moreover, the CA 
continued, "a failure to award interest as of the date of 
- - 5. 
infringement would encourage defendants to draw out litigation for 
as long a period as possible. The only sufferer from such a result 
would be the prevailing plaintiff--the innocent party." (emphasis in 
original}. 
The CA stated that" [p]olicy likewise dictates this result: 
failure in a case like this one to award interest as of the date of 
infringement rewards infringers where those infringers refused to 
accept or negotiate a royalty and discourages the amicable licensing 
of patents." Moreover, the CA cited the parallel §1498 under which 
pre-judgment interest is awarded for patent use by the Government to 
"'accomplish complete justice as between plaintiff and the United 
States.'" The CA concluded that" [t]he failure to award interest to 
plaintiffs here would penalize the prevailing party and reward the 
infringer for its wrongdoing, and we decline to reach such an 
inequitable result ..•. " 
Summary of the Parties' Contentions 
I. Vpetr 
Petr argues that, before 1946, courts disallowed interest on 
infringer's profits or reasonable royalties damages until judgment 
was liquidated, so long as the defense was in good faith and not -reckleys . The controlling decision on reasonable royalty judgments 
was ?ciplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448 (1936). 
This Court there held that, in the absence of "exceptional 
circumstances," interest on such a judgment does not start until the 
date damages are liquidated. From the Duplate facts, and other 
decisions of this Court, it was clear that "exceptional 
• 
- -
circumstances" could not exist in the absence of a finding the 
defendant acted in bad faith or was reckless. 
6. 
Interest was first referred to in the patent statutes in 1946. 
As passed by the House, the bill leading to the 1946 Patent Act 
required interest "from the time the infringement occurred." 92 
Cong. Rec. 1857 (1946). The Senate deleted this mandatory interest 
provision and substituted "such costs, and interest, as may be fixed 
by the court." 92 Cong. Rec. 9187-9188. The House then accepted 
the Senate version of the bill. See 9 2 Cong. Rec. 9881. 
I l l \ 
Petr's arguments turn on the critical assumption that the 1946 ~ 
Patent Act categorically rejected mandatory prejudgment interest and 
adopted in its place language consistent with Duplate. 
Considerations unique to patent cases gave Congress special reason 
to adhere to Duplate. The Patent Office cannot avoid issuing 
invalid patents. Court surveillance is essential before a patent 
becomes an established monopoly--especially where there is a good 
faith nonreckless defense. But court review cannot materialize 
unless the accused infringer defends. There are strong incentives 
on the accused infringer to license or otherwise avoid the 
litigation. The presumption of validity favors the patentee, 
litigation expense is unavoidable, key personnel are tied up in 
litigation. Advance notice that interest will not be assessed, 
provided the defense is in good faith and not reckless, tends to 
offset these obstacles, particularly since interest is normally 
substantial. Mindful of this consideration, Congress declined to 
tilt the scales still further in favor of the patentee . 
- - 7. 
Congress again addressed the interest provision when 35 u.s.c. 
§284 was enacted as a part of the 1952 Patent Code. The Code is the 
carefuly crafted result of an in-depth review. of the patent 
statutes. Where Congress thought guidelines to the courts were 
desirable, they were expressed. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (stating that §103 was a codification of judicial 
precedents). Where the Congress intended to change the law, as in 
§271, it did so. See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 
176, 213-216 (1980) (w/POWELL, J.): id., at 238 (WHITE, J., 
dissenting). As enacted, §284 left the law where it stood by 
repeating almost exactly the language of the 1946 Patent Act. This 
language excludes mandatory interest. But, consistently with 
Duplate, it permits discretionary award of interest after there has 
been a finding of bad faith or reckless conduct by the infringer. 
Petr contends that the courts have continued to follow Duplate. 
A few decisions, however, notably the CA2's decision in Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 
302 (1971), have indicated by dictum that §284 permits a somewhat 
broader exercise of discretion "although the question is not free 
from doubt." But where interest has been allowed in these cases, -- ________ '--" __________ _
' ~xceptional circumstancd~ have been present and the exercise of 
discretion has been within the framework of the Duplate rule. 
Petr argues that, if §284 should be broadened in accordance 
with the dictum in Georgia-Pacific "to grant the trial court its 
traditional discretinary power in equity," prejudgment interest 
would still be improper in this case. The trial court's 
"traditional discretionary power in equity" requires a balancing of 
• 
- -
the equities for and against each party. As shown by the found 
facts and indisputable record facts, these equities are 
overwhelmingly in petr's favor. 
Petr urges that the CA3's judgment be reversed and interest 
allowed only from the date the damages were liquidated by the 
master's report. 
II. Resps 
Resps start with the statute: under §284, the court "shall" 
award "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement." 
8. 
Damages must not be not less than "a reasonable royalty" with 
"interest and costs as fixed by the court." The plain meaning of 
the statute, therefore, supports the award of interest from the date 
of infringement, both for "adequate compensation" and as "interest." 
Resps argue that this Court approved this interpretation of 
§284, as amended in 1946 and reenacted in 1952, in Aro. The Court 
quoted approvingly from the congressional reports that the basis of 
recovery was to be "not less than a reasonable royalty, together 
with interest from the time infringement occurred, rather than 
profits and damages." Both House and Senate Committess reporting 
....._ 
the bill enacted in 1946 stated that its object was to provide 
adequate compensation, not less than a reasonable royalty, to 
include "interest from the date of infringement." See H.R. Rep. 
1587, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). No spokesman for the bill in 
either body ever indicated a change in this legislative intent. 
Resps argue that petr "makes up out of whole cloth" its 
contention that Congress had special reasons for not changing the 
interest rule in 1946. Congress struck the balance when it 
• 
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eliminated profits, but awarded interest. It thereby removed the 
penalty against the good-faith infringer by letting him keep his 
profits but also abolished the penalty against the patent holder by 
giving him prejudgment interest to make him whole. 
Resps argue that the authorities since Aro further support the 
CA3's judgment. In Georgia-Pacific, the CA2 sustained an interest 
award from date of last infringement as within the DC's discretion, 
under the 1946 amendment, even in/ he absence of a finding of 
exceptional circumstances. In )l{a rvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery 
Mills, Inc., 386 F.2d 287, 290 n.3 ~ 967), the court stated that 
"[t]he legislative history of the ~ mendment, as recited in th] 
Aro case, [] shows that the sponsors of the bill contemplated the 
allowance of interest from the time of infringement." (emphasis i 
original). 
Resps defend the award here as necessary to give adequate 
compensation in view of the long delay in their receiving any 
payment at all, to avoid penalizing the innocent patent holder, and 
to avoid giving the infringer-wrongdoer a windfall. Accordingly, 
the Master, the DC, and the CA3 overruled the defense of good faith, 
as the prejudgment interest award was not imposed as a penalty, but 
awarded as delay compensation. Petr adamantly refused to take a 
license on any basis although the patent owner gave it notice it was 
infringing in 1955 and commenced suit in 1956. Petr could have 
negotiated a license at any time before 1956, from which the 
interest award dates, since, as the Master held, licenses were the 
only potential source of income from the patent. 
- - 10. 
Policy reasons also support petr's interpretation of §284. As 
the CA3 noted, the denial of interest "discourages the amicable 
licensing of patents" which is against the "policy" of the patent 
system. Such denial is also unsound administration of justice, 
because it encourages the infringer to delay merely to enjoy the use 
of the money before the day of reckoning. 
Resps argue that, under these circumstances, there is no reason 
for this Court to disturb the findings, conclusions, and careful 
exercise of discretion by the ~tBe DC, and the CA3. 
I. 
=-
A. Statute. Petr correctly describes the law before 1946. In 
its pre-1946 version of §284, then known as §70, Congress provided 
merely for "a reasonable sum as profits or general damages for the 
infringement." See Deller's Walker on Patents 2d, at 551. Thus, 
the statute provided for a multiple of damages "in its [the court's] 
discretion." Omitted was any reference to "interest" or to 
"adequate compensation not less than a reasonable royalty." See 
Tiligham v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 160 (1888). 
B. Case Law. In Duplate, the Court held that, "if ..• an award 
of damages upon the basis of a reasonable royalty becomes 
appropriate again, we think that interest should run from the date 
when the damages are liquidated, and not, as by the present decree, 
from the date of last infringement," because there "are no 
exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from what is at 
least the general rule." 298 U.S., at 459. "Exceptional 
- - 11. 
circumstances" meant lack of "earnest controversy and of uncertain 
issue." See Tilgham v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 161 (1888). 
c. Policy Basis for Duplate Rule. There is some justification 
for such a rule in that reasonable royalty damages for patent 
infringement are unpredictable. They cannot be known and are not 
liquidated until each royalty-bearing product or process is 
identified and the reasonable royalty rate is ascertained. Duplate 
was a recognition of the unliquidated character of a reasonable 
royalty. 
Patent litigation is not just a matter of private rights. Good 
faith, nonreckless defenses to patent charges are an essential 
element of the patent system. The Patent Office is compelled to 
accept every patent application. Proceedings are ex parte. It must 
examine as best it can, strained by its limited resources, the prior 
art. Pertinent information, such as prior invention and prior 
public uses, is usually unknown to the Patent Office. Inevitably, 
there is a "notorious difference between the standards applied by 
the Patent Office and by the Courts" in determining patentability. 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). Patents issue for 
a "shadow of a shade of an idea." Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 
192, 200 (1882). 
This Court observed in Pope Mfg. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 
(1892), that it is "as important to the public that competition 
should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee 
of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly." 
This court surveillance of patents cannot materialize unless accused 
infringers challenge dubious patents and questionable infringement 
- - 12. 
charges. Such challenge is not automatic: business enterprise acts 
in its own self-interest. The expenses--and difficulty--of a patent 
defense are never lightly assumed. See 35 U.S.C. 282 (presumption 
of patent validity); Blonder-Tongue Labs v. University of Illinois 
Resources Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 335 (1971) ("[P]atentees are 
heavily favored as a class of litigants by the patent statute."). 
Further, the prospective deft must undertake an expensive prior art 
search and its scarce technical and management personnel are tied up 
in unproductive court activities. These obstacles generate a strong 
stimulus to take a license or just not to compete. 
It is clear that there is a disincentive to challenge, but it -is not clear that providing prejudgment interest will effect the 
decision to challenge. The use of "royalty" money is a cost from 
the moment of the infringement notice, regardless whether the 
alleged infringer pays that interest then by foregoing the use of 
that money and paying some set royalty, or whether he pays it later 
in a damage award to the patent owner. It is clear, however, that 
not providing for prejudgment interest provides an incentive to 
challenge, thus encouraging court action rather than negotiations. 
Selective allowance of interest (for bad faith challenges) merely 
reduces that incentive to litigate where the defense is totally 
without merit. 
In Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168 (1933), 
the Court stated: 
It has been recognized that a distinction, in this 
respect, simply as between cases of liquidated and 
unliquidated damages, is not a sound one. Whether the 
case is of the one class or the other, the injured party 
has suffered a loss which may be regarded as not fully 
compensated if he is confined to the amount found to be 
• 
- -
recoverable as of the time of breach and nothing is added 
for the delay in obtaining the award of damages. Because 
of this fact, the rule with respect to unliquidated claims 
has been in evolution •.•. "The disinclination to allow 
interest on claim of uncertain amount seems based on 
practice rather than theoretical grounds." Williston on 
Contracts, vol. III, §1413. 
13. 
D. Conclusion. Although prejudgment interest was clearly not 
allowed before 1946, there seems no particular reason to continue 
such a rule unless it is clear that Congress intended such a result. 
✓ 
II. The 1946 Statute 
A. "Adequate to Compensate." Because §284 mandates damages 
adequate to compensate for an infringement and not less than a 
reasonable royalty, it clearly arguable that the provision ----~ - ~ 
.-- ---- ----- - ---encompasses delay compensation where the courts find that such 
' ~ 
compensation is in fact a proper part of "adequate compensation" and 
an integral part of the "reasonable royalty." Both the { c and the 
~ A did just that. An award of interest in this case was not a 
~
punitive device: interest represents damages for delay in payment 
and compensation for use of resps' money that should have been 
included in withheld annual royalty statements if such had been 
rendered by the infringer. Adequacy of compensation and the amount 
of the reasonable royalty are questions of fact, and thus not 
subject to review by this Court where they have been affirmed by the 
CA3 as not "clearly erroneous." (It also should be noted that Judge 
Caleb Wright--known as one of the best patent judges in the country-
-was the DC Judge). 
Such view has been taken by the Court in applying 28 U.S.C. 
§1498, under which the U.S. Government pays compensation for patent 
use. In Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 509 (1931): "The 
• 
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statute grants 'recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation 
for such use.' We are of opinion that interest should be allowed in 
order to make the compensation 'entire.' [W]e cannot doubt that it 
was intended to accomplish complete justice as between the plaintiff 
and the United States." See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 
446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980) ("It is virtually self-evident that 
extending interest-free credit for a period of time is equivalent to 
giving a discount [from the purchase price] equal to the value of 
the use of the purchase price for that period of time."); Jacobs v. 
United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (holding that interest from time 
of the taking is necessary to constitute "just compensation" under 
the 5th A). See also ALI, Restatement of Restitution §157, at 627 
("In actions for restitution brought because of a conversion of 
chattels, the measure of restitution is the value of the chattels, 
together with, ordinarily, interest from the time of the 
conversion."); ALI, Restatement of Torts 2d §913, at 488 (calling 
for interest to be awarded for "harms to pecuniary interest from the 
time of the accrual of the cause of action to the time of judgment, 
if the payment of interest is required to avoid an injustice"). 
Despite the logic of such an approach, it is probably true that 
Congress would not have placed the clause on "interest" also in §284 
if it intended to include interest in "adequate to compensate." An 
interpretation to the contrary should be avoided, else the clause on 
"interest" is redundant. Thus, the Court should not embrace this 
view of L CA3. 
B. "Interest." The face of the 1946 statute also permits 
"interest and costs as fixed by the court." A plain reading of the 
~
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statute would indicate that the award of "interest" is not left to 
...----, 
the discretion of the court, but the amount is. 
~
c. Aro. In Aro, the Court quoted the House Report also 
adopted by the Senate. It is clear that the sole purpose of the Aro 
quotation was to confirm that the 1946 Act eliminated recovery of 
the infringer's profits, and the Court was not concerned with 
prejudgment interest and did not discuss it. Thus, Aro does not 
compel the result in this case. 
D. Conclusion. Congress clearly did not draw any distinction 
between liquidated and unliquidated claims on the face of the 
statute. Unless there is something in the legislative history that 
indicates otherwise, it is difficult to conclude but that Congress 
in 1946 meant to change the existing law as to interest on 
unliquidated infringement damages. The fairest reading of the 
statute is that interest is mandatory, but separate from the award 
of royalties "adequate to compensate." The amount of interest is 
left to the discretion of th~ ourt. 
III. vf:'egislative History 
A. Patent Act of 1946. The major change in the 1946 Patent 
Act was the elimination of the infringer's profits as a basis for a 
money award, thus limiting the patentee to his damages. See Aro, 
377 U.S., at 504-507. The statute codified this Court's earlier 
decision in Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline, 235 U.S. 641, 648 
(1915). Senator Pepper explained this change on the floor of the 
Senate, after which Senator Revercomb asked: "Mr. President, do I 
correctly understand that the explanation the Senator has made 
covers all the changes which the bill proposes to make?" Senator 
• 
- -
Pepper answered: "That is correct, except for the changing of the 
word 'decree' to the word 'judgment.'" 92 Cong. Rec. 9187-9188 
(1946). 
16 • 
This statement is poor support for petr's argument that 
Congress did not intend to change the Duplate rule, because clearly 
Senator Pepper did not recall all the wording changes made in the 
Act. The truth is that it is not clear wh the Senate_9 hanged the 
language of the House bill or whether the substituted language 
really differs in mea ng from that deleted. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the Senate Committee expressly adopted the 
House Committee Report, even though the Senate Committee did not 
agree to make an attorney's fee award mandatory nor to the limiting 
of that award to the patent holder. See S. Rep. No. 1503, 79th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). The Sen. Rep. made clear that the purpose 
of the change was to render the award of attorney's fees 
discretionary. There is no indication that the Senate intended to 
change the interest provision of the House bill other than that the 
language of the bill itself was changed. Indeed, when the bill came 
back to the House, Congressman Lanham, who managed the bill, 
explained: "The Senate amendments do not interfere with the purport 
of the bill. There is a provision with reference to attorneys' fees 
and how they shall be paid." Cong. Rec. 9881. 
It seems clear that Congress meant to change the Duplate rule. 
The real issue is whether Congress intended to make interest awards 
man9 atory Ql: di 5.Q£.etionary. Given the wording change in the bill, 
7 
the fairest interpretation of the legislative history is that 
Congress meant to make the amount of the interest award (from when 
• 
- -
it would run) discretionary with the Court, but the award itself 
discretionary. 
B. Patent Act of 1952. In 1952, Congress rewrote §284 to 
provide its present language, with very little change in the 
pertinent provision. Although it is clear that Congress changed 
many parts of the patent laws in 1952, see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §271 
17 . 
(overruling Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)), 
the relevant congressional intent behind §284 should be considered 
' 
that of the 1946 Congress. It is interesting to note, however, that 
Congress in 1952 specifically provided for an award of attorney's 
fees only in "exceptional cases," 35 u.s.c. §285, thus seriously 
undermining petr's argument that §284 was meant to codify the 
Duplate rule. 
C. Conclusion. The legislative history, if anything, supports 
resps' contention that the award of prejudgment interest is 
mandatory. There is no basis for the conclusion that Congress had ----...... 
"special reasons" for not changing the interest rule when it amended 
the patent statute in 1946. If anything is discretionary, it is 
when interest will be considered to start running. 
✓ 
The point of Aro's quotation from the legislative history, if 
) it is at all relevant, is that Congress struck the balance in 1946 
when it eliminated profits but awarded interest. It thereby removed 
the penalty against the good-faith infringer by letting him keep his 
profits, but also abolished the penalty against the patent holder by 
giving him interest to make him whole. Award of an infringer's 
profits was a windfall to the patent holder, but a failure to award 
interest was a windfall to the infringer. Thus, the old system 
- -
violated the statute's new principle of indemnification in both 
respects. It is not surprising, then, that Duplate was not 
continued by the 126 Congress. 
IV. Policy Rationale for Interest Awards 
The policies clearly support mandatory interest awards. 
18. 
"Special circumstances" is a concept germane to a pe~alty award, not 
to adequate compensation for appropriation of plaintiffs' property. 
Interest is an essential ingredient of adequate compensation. As 
the Master correctly noted, the present situation is not different 
from the situations where a license provides for royalties that 
become defaulted; where there is an established royalty; where the 
Government is the user; where a contract is breached; where a deft 
receives a benefit, but tortiously withholds the price from pltf. 
In all these cases, interest is proper from the date of the breach, 
use, or wrong. 
It is a safe assumption that petr put the money withheld for 
royalties to some use. The issue is simply who should get the 
earnings of that money. It makes little sense to give resps the 
money but not its earnings. Moreover, the failure to award interest 
not only discourages amicable licensing of patents, it encourages 
infringers to continue fighting lawsuits, perhaps brought in good 
faith, long after the justification for doing so is obviously gone. 
Finally, inflation must be considered to make a pltf whole, and 
prejudgment interest is an appropriate way to take inflation into 
account. 
Petr could have taken a license with provision for interest on 
late payments and still challenged the validity of the patent, so 
- - 19. 
there is no more connection between allowing challenges to patents 
and interest than there is between such challenges and any other 
element of indemnification of the patent holder for infringement of 
his patent. The system should certainly protect challenges to 
dubious patents, but by the same token, it should encourage 
invention by protecting valid patents and by treating infringement 
of a valid patent as a property tort, with the patent holder 
entitled to full indemnification. See Carbice Corp. of America v. 
American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931). 
V. Discretion 
The primary equity in petr's favor is that resps represented in - -
the CA7, in which circuit this suit began, that, if petr wanted to 
avoid infringement, all it need do is leave out the borax. Resps 
apparently, however, changed their mind and continued the suit. 
Presumably, petr would have switched to a non-damages-creating 
bumper process if it had not relied on resps' statement. There is 
not, however, much in the way of factual findings to support petr's 
assertions of overreaching by resps. 
This "equity" goes more to Duplate's "special circumstances" 
requirement than it does to the discretion of the court to award 
interest from the date of infringement. More relevant to that 
inquiry is the fact that the interest here is as much as or more 
than the royalties. Clearly, petr came out a big winner for \ 
litigating rather than paying periodic royalty if it does not hav ~ 
to pay prejudgment interest. No ~ of infringement was g l ven in 
1955: petr took a chance on litigating. He "loses" nothing by 
.,,_----.-
paying over the earnings on ~hat w~ not his from the ':J te of that 
- - 20. 
infringement. It cannot be said that the lower courts' abused their 
discretion in beginning the computation of interest from the date of 
infringement. The Court "cannot say that the [award] was either so 
unfair or son inequitable as to require [the Court] to upset it." 
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411 (1962). 
Summary 
1. I think the evidence and policies support making 
r 
prejudgment interest mandatory under §284. It is not as clear that ......______.__ 
such interest must run from the date of infringement. That 
consideration should be left to the discretion of the court. Here, 
it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion in awarding 
prejudgment interest from the date of infringement. 
2. Affirm. 
,k /JJ-~~ ~ 
vk-~~~ 
~ ~ ~ ~~ 
~ - • 
81-1661 GENERAL MOTORS v. DEVEX CORP. Argued 12/7/82 
.,/1-, ~-~- /A..v~~ 
~ ~ lfu.:f JA,.,t._,,~~~~'LL/,,,L,,(, '4 ~ ~ -6 ~u.,,_1  
A-c.:1-t • t C L.i&C~~~e:u...,~~~~f 
/W- ~~, ~ C-d CJ43 ~ ~ 
''~'-~ ~4 ~ ~ ~~ 
~t>(/'3 s- u S' C---"g ;rl.J ~'f 
-~ 
-- -
~~e>r~ ~ 7 1 
~~,,,~~ : 02,'fj 
·~~~~/~ ?>gz ~ 
~'~ l-/? h,~~ 
-~,vu ~J--q 
7!_..j ;,;za,a4-,n4, ..e>r V '-P-7 
~ ;-, ~ ~~ ~ ~~ 
'~~~~~~~ --~ ~ --n-v 44 ~ ~ ~ 
~~~~~~ 
~~~~~Q-7' 
 J-.r, "'.AT ~ ~ ~ -~
H--:J ~~-~~;,..,~ 
~ ,Ph7-,f  ~ P9?'"" ~ 
fl~ '7-p'?-q?yh-rn-t,,~~-~ 
ti • • ~,, ~"'>->7\I ~ -I~ 
~ ~..2? z ~,...o~ ,,~ ... • ~)-r?? o/-/J b I 
. r~l'~f,-,,_, ~ -~ 
~;,_,..,..~ ,-P,8?§~~ ~ ~ti";; 
. ~ .;,Lzr-~ ~ ~---r? d . ~ 




~ '21/;? ~ C ~ 77, ,' ~)~'YV! 
~--~~~~ -hf/ J 
[ YY>'?rYW'~~ 
~~~~-~ 
j-P ·--~I?"':~~  <3/ ;~ 
~:PJ~ IJ .  ~ -'rr14 ~ ~ 
~~ ~g7 ~  (~) 
~_/:?~ ·~¼~~ 
----~ ~----1- 6 -~~ ~ -~ 
~~~~_,_.,~ 
~ 
1-4 ~ ??H ~ Irv~ ,,~ 7 
rH -n,-~ ~,~ ~ 
#- ~~ 
,~~,, -~ ~s. 
~~ ~ & -I/;:; 
~)~ 
~~ ~ ~~ I~-~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
. ~~~ ~ -o/ ~ 67;1 
~ ~ -r-~ 






, ~ ~ ;--,-,~~ 





-,-,~.s~--rw~ '?e €1-1 
'Ft:::1--PP~ ,rn-,vs.:zl/.?/ 
-, ,. • ,"J7~ " " \ r;G, ~ ,8-Z ,; ~ .,..,..., "f, ~ 
(~;~-
Memorandum 
2. . ,. 2- g l/-~ 
~~~6-L 
a,,i_ «. ~ ~ 
~
~ 
~•~1-.. .... ~, 
 
- - --- -------
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum I 2-/ K 
%1-1,6,/ C/1/v~ 
/J~ -1-i) 11''+6 -~ 
~/h'-1--~-~-r 
~~~~~ 
~  ,-~~~,~~ 
~\\ 
I 
;e ~-q-o e 
No. 81-1661 General Motors v. Devex Conf. 12/10/82 
The Chief Justice z:lf.J ,...:...,. 
;J~~j2Y¥-~4~~ 
~7  ,,~~,_ L--..,~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u--
~ ~~~-o-<,--< ~A--l~ ~ ~~~ 
q, Y1/. /4 • ..dl u-,..L_ ~ ~/;;d ~ ~ -It 4 "'t, 
w~ ~ ..§2s-¢ ~ 
~,~~ ... -~ ~~ d 
~{.,.,,,L. 
Justice Brennan 2:J,ff ~ 
Justice White ar;;._,,._ . 
• l 
~ ~~ ~ ,l,;::,_,q ~ 
... 
~ ''_...__...c-~~~lf- - CA,..._,,~ ,, 
.e 
Justice Marshall {A..ff-~ 
~~ 
~ 
Justice Blackmun t1--t,-~ 
~~ 
Justice Powell ~ 1 ~ 
-
~ h-,,.__ ~ -t,....,,.,_ -
~ 9-
~ 
..,,. t . :,. 
- -
Justice Rehnquist c2f/ ~ 
' ( /M..d ~ J..:;::;-~ -/4.,. 
Justice Stevens 0-f-/- ;__ 
~-- .e •• L ;;:__,_ ~ , 
~~~~ 
Justice O'Connor ~ ~ 











From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated: _ A_P_R_ 2_6_1 ___ _ 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1661 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. 
DEVEX CORPORATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1983] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case concerns the proper standard governing the 
award of prejudgment interest in a patent infringement suit 
under 35 U. S. C. §284. 
I 
In 1946 respondent Devex Corporation (Devex) filed a suit 
for patent infringement against petitioner General Motors 
Corporation (GMC) in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois. 1 Devex alleged that GMC 
was infringing Reissue Patent No. 24,017, known as the 
"Hendricks" or "Devex" patent. The patent covered a 
lubricating process used in the cold-forming of metal car 
parts by pressure. 2 On June 29, 1962, the District Court 
'The suit also named Houdaille Industries as a defendant. After the 
case against GMC was transfered to the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware, the case against Houdaille Industries was tried 
separately, see Devex Corp. v. Houdaille Ind., 382 F. 2d 17 (CA7 1967), 
and eventually settled. 
2 Claim 4 of the Patent covers: 
"The process of working ferrous metal which comprises forming on the sur-
face of the metal a phosphate coating and superimposing thereon a fixed 
film of a composition comprising a solid meltable organic binding material 






2 GENERAL MOTORS CORP. v. DEVEX CORP. 
held the Devex patent invalid and entered judgment for 
GMC. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the finding of invalidity and re-
manded for further proceedings. Devex Corp. v. General 
Motors Corp., 321 F. 2d 234 (CA7 1963), cert. denied, 375 
U1S. 971 (1964). 
/ The case was then transferred to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Delaware. After a trial the 
District Court ruled that there had been no infringement. 
316 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Del. 1970). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the 
patent was infringed by GM C's use of certain processes in the 
production of bumpers and cold-extruded non-bumper parts. 
467 F. 2d 257 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 973 (1973). 
On remand the case was referred to a Special Master for an 
accounting. The Special Master ruled that three major divi-
sions of GMC had used infringing processes in the manufac-
ture of bumper parts, and selected a royalty rate "by refer-
ence to hypothetical negotiations" that it found would have 
taken place if GMC had sought to obtain a license from 
Devex. Special Master's Report at 71. 3 The District Court 
modified the royalty rate selected by the Special Master and 
entered judgment pursuant to 35 U. S. C. §284, awarding 
at a temperatuare below the melting point of the ferrou@ etal phosphate / 
of said coating and having a hardness not exceeding 5 on the Mohs' hard-
ness scale, and thereafter deforming the metal. " 
In less technical terms, the Devex process employed "phosphate, soap 
and borax ... to lubricate the pressure-forming operation, preventing 
harmful contact between the metal products and the machinery with which 
they are formed .... [T]he phosphate, soap and borax combination is espe-
cially beneficial because it may be easily cleaned from the metal product 
following its formation." Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 494 F . 
Supp. 1369, 1372 (D.Del. 1980). 
3 The Special Master also ruled that multiple damages and attorney's 
fees, which are authorized by 28 U. S. C. §§ 284 and 285, would be inappro-
priate in this case. These findings were adopted by the District Court and 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and are not before us. 
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Devex $8,813,945.50 in royalties, $11,022,854.97 in prejudg-
ment interest, and post-judgment interest at the rate allowed 
by State law. The court determined what the annual royal-
ties payments would have been, and calculated prejudgment 
interest on each payment from the time it would have become 
due. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 667 F. 2d 347 (1981). 
The court held that "the award of prejudgment interest as 
the yearly royalty payments became due was not an abuse of 
discretion." Id., at 363. We granted certiorari to consider 
the standard applicable to the award of prejudgment interest 
under 35 U.S. C. §284, - U.S. - (1982), and we now 
affirm. Ji 
Prior to 1946 the provision of the patent laws concerning a 
plaintiff's recovery in an infringement action contained no 
reference to interest. 4 The award of interest in patent cases 
was governed by the common law standard enunciated in 
several decisions of this Court. E.g., Duplate Corp. v. Tri-
plex Safety Glass Co., 298 U. S. 448 (1936); Tilghman v. 
Proctor, 125 U. S. 136 (1888). Under the Duplate standard, 
prejudgment interest was generally awarded from the date 
on which damages were liquidated, and could be awarded 
from the date of infringement in the absence of liquidation 
only in "exceptional circumstances," such as bad faith on the 
part of the infringer. 298 U. S., at 459. 5 
' R.S. § 4921, as amended, 42 Stat. 392, 35 U. S. C. 70, provided in rele-
vant part: 
"[U]pon a decree being rendered in any such case for an infringement the 
complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be ac-
counted for by the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained 
thereby." 
5 Under the common law rule a plaintiff's damages were often treated as 
liquidated if they were relatively certain and ascertainable by reference to 
established market values. See generally Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 
243, 258 (1924); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.5 (1973); C. McCormick, 
Law of Damages §§ 51, 54-56 (1935); "Prejudgment Interest: An Element 
- -
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/in 1946 Congress adopted amendments to the provision of 
the patent laws governing recovery in infringement actions. 
Act of August 1, 1946, c. 726, § 1, 60 Stat. 778, 35 U. S. C. 
(1946 ed.), §§67, 70. 6 One of the amended provisions, which 
has since been recodified as 35 U. S. C § 284, states in rele-
vant part: 
"Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the in-
fringement, but in no event less than a reasonable roy-
alty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, 
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court." 
The Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions as 
to whether § 284 incorporates the Duplate standard and more 
generally as to the standard governing the award of prejudg-
ment interest under § 284. 7 
of Damages Not to be Overlooked," 8 Cumberland L. Rev. 521, 522-523 
(1977). Thus a plaintiff whose damages were determined by reference to 
an established royalty that the plaintiff charged for the use of the patent 
was entitled to prejudgment interest. In contrast, where a plaintiffs 
damages, as here, were based on a reasonable royalty determined by the 
court, they were unliquidated and not entitled to prejudgment interest ab-
sent exceptional circumstances. 
6 In the 1952 codification, §§ 67 and 70 of the 1946 Code were consoli-
dated in § 284, which has remained unchanged through the present day. 
The stated purpose of the codification was merely "reorganization in lan-
guage to clarify the statement of the statutes." H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess. , at 10, 29 (1952). 
' Compare Columbia Broadcasting System , Inc. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 537 F. 2d 896 (CA7 1976) (no prejudgment interest absent excep-
tional circumstances); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Micek, 395 F. 2d 763 (CA9 
1968) (same) (dictum), with Georgia-Pacific Corp . v. U. S. Plywood-
Champion Papers , Inc., 446 F. 2d 294 (CA2) (§284 does not incorporate 
Duplate standard), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 870 (1971); Trio Process Corp. 
v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 638 F . 2d 661 (CA3 1981) (same); General 
Electric Corp. v. Sciaky Bros. Inc ., 415 F. 2d 1068 (CA6 1969) (same); 
Milgo Electric Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc., 623 F. 2d 
645 (CAl0) (same), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1066 (1980). 
- -
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We have little doubt that § 284 does not incorporate the 
Duplate standard. Under that standard, which evolved as a 
matter of federal common law, prejudgment interest could 
not be awarded where damages were unliquidated absent bad 
faith or other exceptional circumstances. By contrast, § 284 
gives a court general authority to fix interest and costs. On 
the face of § 284, a court's authority to award interest is not 
restricted to exceptional circumstances, and there is no war-
rant for imposing such a limitation. When Congress wished 
to limit an element of recovery in a patent infringement ac-
tion it said so explicitly. With respect to attorney's fees, 
Congress expressly provided that a court could award such 
fees to a prevailing party only "in exceptional cases." 35 / 
U.S. C. §285.8 The power to award )(interest was not 
similarly restricted. 
There is no basis for inf erring that Congress' adoption of 
the provision concerning interest merely incorporated the 
Duplate standard. This is not a case in which Congress has 
reenacted statutory language that the courts had interpreted 
in a particular way. In such a situation, it may well be ap-
propriate to inf er that Congress intended to adopt the estab-
lished judicial interpretation. See, e. g., Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, -- U. S. --, -- (1983); Loril-
lard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978). In this case, 
however, the predecessor statute did not contain any refer-
ence to interest, and the 1946 amendments specifically added 
a provision concerning interest in patent infringement ac-
tions. We cannot agree with petitioner that the only signifi-
cance of Congress' express provision for the award of interest 
• Section 285 provides: "The court in exceptional cases may award rea-
sonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. " The phrase "exceptional 
cases" was not contained in the 1946 amendments, but was added by the 
1952 compilation for purposes of clarification only. See note 6, supra. 
The language of the 1946 amendments provided in relevant part that "the 
Court may in its discretion award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevail-
ing party." 35 U. S. C. § 70 (emphasis added). 
- -
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was the incorporation of a common law standard that devel-
oped in the absence of any specific provision concerning 
int~est. 
A-laving decided that § 284 does not incorporate the Duplate 
rule, we turn to a consideration of the proper standard for 
awarding prejudgment interest under that provision. Al-
though the language of § 284 supplies little guidance as to the 
appropriate standard, for the reasons elaborated below we 
are convinced that the underlying purpose of the provision 
strongly suggests that prejudgment interest should ordi-
narily be awarded where necessary to afford the plaintiff full 
compensation for the infringement. 
Both the background and language of § 284 provide evi-
dence of this fundamental purpose. Under the pre-1946 
statute, the owner of a patent could recover both his own 
damages and the infringer's profits. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Top Co., 377 U. S. 476, 505 (1964); n. 4, supra. 
A patent owner's ability to recover the infringer's profits re-
flected the notion that he should be able to force the infringer 
to disgorge the fruits of the infringement even if it caused 
him no injury. In 1946 Congress excluded consideration of 
the infringer's gain by eliminating the recovery of his profits, 
Aro Mfg., supra, at 505, the determination of which had of-
ten required protracted litigation. H. R. Rep. No. 1587, 
79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1946); S. Rep. No. 1503, 79th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1946); 92 Cong. Rec. 9188 (1946) (remarks 
of Senator Pepper). At the same time, Congress sought to 
ensure that the patent owner would in fact receive full com-
pensation for "any damages" he suffered as a result of the in-
fringement. See H. R. Rep., supra, at 1 ("any damages the 
complainant can prove"); S. Rep., supra, at 2 (same). Ac-
cordingly, Congress expressly provided in § 284 that the 
court "shall award the claimant damages adequate to compen-
sate for the infringement." (Emphasis added.) 9 
9 The wording of the amendment passed by Congress in 1946 was 
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The standard governing the award of prejudgment interest 
under § 284 should be consistent with Congress' overriding 
purpose of affording patent owners complete compensation. 
In light of that purpose, we conclude that prejudgment inter-
est should ordinarily be awarded. In the typical case an 
award of prejudgment interest is necessary to ensure that 
the patent owner is placed in as good a position as he would 
have been in had the infringer entered into a reasonable roy-
alty agreement. 10 An award of interest from the time that 
cover general damages which shall be due compensation" for the infringe-
ment. 35 U. S. C. § 70 (emphasis added). See note 6, SU'JYl"a. 
Section 284 derived from a House bill which specifically provided for an 
award of interest "from the time the infringement occurred." H. R. 5311 
(1946), see H. R. Rep. 1587, 79th Cong., 2s Sess., Pt. 2, p.1. The bill as 
modified by the Senate Committee and enacted into law replaced this lan-
guage with the language currently contained in § 284. The legislative his-
tory suggests that the language substitution was intended solely to make 
the award of attorney's fees discretionary rather than mandatory; there 
was no indication that the Senate Committee intended any substantive 
change in the treatment of interest. See S. Rep., SU'JYl"a, at 2. The pas-
sage of the Senate bill in the House was preceded by an assurance by Rep. 
Lanham, who managed the bill, that the the only substantive modification 
of the House bill concerned the attorney's fees provision. 92 Cong. Rec. 
10649 (1946) . 
10 See Waite v. United States, 282 U. S. 508, 509 (1931); Jacobs v. United 
States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933) (interest from time of the taking is neces-
sary to constitute adequate compensation under the Fifth Amendment); 
Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 258 (1924) (prejudgment interest re-
quired for "full compensation"); A.L.I. Restatement of Restitution, § 157, 
at 627 ("In actions for restitution brought because of a conversion of chat-
tels, the measure of restitution is the value of the chattels, together with, 
ordinarily, interest from the time of the conversion." (Emphasis added.)). 
The traditional view, which treated prejudgment interest as a penalty 
awarded on the basis of the defendant's conduct, has gradually given way 
to the view that prejudgment interest represents "delay damages" and 
should be awarded as a component of full compensation. See D. Dobbs, 
Law of Remedies §3.5, at 174; C. McCormick, Law of Damages §51, at 
206-211 (1935); "Prejudgment Interest: An Element of Damages Not To 
Be Overlooked," 8 Cumberland L. Rev. 521 (1977). The denial of prejudg-
ment not only undercompensates the patent owner but may also grant a 
- -
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the royalty payments would have been received merely 
serves to make the patent owner whole, since his damages 
consist not only of the value of the royalty payments but also 
of the foregone use of the money between the time of in-
fringement and the date of the judgment. 
This very principle was the basis of the decision in Waite v. 
United States, 282 U. S. 508 (1931), which involved a patent 
infringement suit against the United States. The patent 
owner had been awarded unliquidated damages in the form of 
lost profits, id., at 508, but had been denied an award of pre-
judgment interest. This Court held that an award of pre-
judgment interest to the patent owner was necessary to en-
sure "complete justice as between the plaintiff and the 
United States," id., at 509, even though the statute govern-
ing such suits did not expressly provide for interest. Just as 
§ 284 provides that the court shall award "damages adequate 
to compensate for the infringement," the statute at issue in 
Waite provided that the patentee shall receive "reasonable 
and entire compensation." 28 U. S. C. § 1498. In addition, 
§ 284 contains a specific provision concerning interest. 
Waite thus provides strong support for our conclusion that 
prejudgment interest should ordinarily be awarded under 
§284. 
We do not construe § 284 as requiring the award of pre-
judgment interest whenever infringement is found. That 
provision states that interest shall be "fixed by the court," 
and in our view it leaves the court some discretion in award-
ing prejudgment interest. For example, it may be appropri-
ate to limit prejudgment interest, or perhaps even deny it al-
together, where the patent owner has been responsible for 
undue delay in prosecuting the lawsuit. 11 There may be 
windfall to the infringer and create an incentive to prolong litigation. 
There is no reason why an infringer should stand in a better position than a 
party who agrees to pay royalty and then fails to pay because of financial 
difficulties. 
11 See, e.g., Board of Commissioners v. United States , 308 U. S. 343, 
,.. - -
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other circumstances in which it may be appropriate not to 
award prejudgment interest. We need not delineate those 
circumstances in this case. We hold only that prejudgment 
interest should be awarded under § 284 absent some justifica-
tion for withholding such an award. 12 
III 
Because we hold that prejudgment interest should ordi-
narily be awarded absent some justification for withholding 
such an award, a decision to award prejudgment interest will 
only be set aside if it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. 
The District Court held that GMC infringed Devex's patent 
over the course of a number of years and awarded Devex a 
reasonable royalty as compensation. While GMC contends 
that Devex was guilty of causing unnecessary delay, the Dis-
trict Court rejected this contention when it concluded that 
"Devex has done no worse than fully litigate its claims 
achieving a large judgment in its favor" and awarded Devex 
costs on the basis of this conclusion. 494 F. Supp., at 1380. 13 
On these facts, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
award of prejudgment interest was proper. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit is 
Affirmed. 
352-353 (1939); Redfield v. Bartels, 139 U. S. 694, 701 (1891); First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago v. Material Serv. Corp., 597 F . 2d 1110, 1121-1121 
(CA7 1979). See generally C. McCormick, supra, at 220-221, 228-229 
(cases cited therein); 8 Cumberland L. Rev., supra, at 534 (cases cited 
therein). 
12 Of course, if a patentee's award includes treble damages or attorney's 
fees , an award of prejudgment interest may not be necessary to provide 
full compensation. 
13 The District Court's decision to award costs rested on its conclusion 
that Devex did not cause "unnecessary delay or [obtain] only slight suc-
cess." 494 F. Supp., at 1380. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award 
of costs, and that issue is not before us. 
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I agree. 
I do have one suggestion to make. Your footnote 12 suggests 
that a court might, in its discretion, decide to award no 
interest if adequate compensation is provided by attorney's fees 
or treble damages. This seems to me to under cut the deterrent 
and punitive purposes of the fees and treble damages; they can't 
accomplish their statutory' purpose unless they are assessed on 
top of whatever ordinary compensatory damages (including -
interest} are awarded. May I suggest, instead, noting simply 
that interest should not be awarded on attorney's fees and the 
non-compensatory portion of treble damages? 
Sincerely, 
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Justice Marshall 
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Please join me. I shall leave to your good judgment 
the response to Bill Brennan's suggestion about footnote 12. 
Justice Marshall 
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Sincerely, 
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Dear Thurgood: 
I agree with almost all of your opinion, and will be 
joining if you could make changes along two lines. First, 
the opinion relies on authorities from a few non-patent 
contexts in qrriving at its interpretation of §284. See, 
~, p.·· 7 n.10, citing A.L.I. Restatement of Restitution, 
D. Dobbs; Law of Remedies, and so forth. The evidence that 
you have set out · regarding Congress' intent in enacting §284 
seems more than adequate to support the result in this case, 
without discussion of the way the law has evolved in other 
ar e as unrelated to the federal patent laws. I would be much 
more comfortable if you could eliminate the references in 
note 10 to nonpatent cases. 
I would also hope that the opinion will not be read as 
an invitation to litigate interest awards in patent cases. 
While you go a long way toward this result by making it 
quite clear that an award of prejudgme nt interest will be 
reviewed on an abuse of discretion basis, see, e.g., p. 10, 
you do not make quite as clear the fact that a refusal to 
award interest will be judged by a similar standard. A 
sentence at the end of foo t note 11 would satisfy my 
concerns. 
Since you have a court in the p r esent draft, I would 
understand if you were reluctant to make any changes. If 
you decide not to, I might write a brief concurrence along 
those lines. 
Justice Ma r shall 
cc: The Co nfe rence 
Sincerely, t', ~ ,, 
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May 6, 1983 
Re: 81-1661 - General Motors Corp. v. Devex 
Corp. 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I have difficulty in describing it with 
any precision, I am inclined to believe that there may 
be another category of cases in which it may be 
appropriate to limit or to deny entirely prejudgment 
interests. I have in mind a case in which there is 
especially strong reason to believe that an untested 
patent may in fact be invalid, and in which there would 
be an especially strong public interest in having the ) 
patent tested. I wonder if you would consider adding 
at the end of the last sentence on page 8, the 
following additional language together with the 
following additional footnote: 
", or where the infringer in good faith had 
especially strong reasons for questioning the 
patent's validity."!.._/ 
~ 
*/In other contexts we have noted that the public 
Tnterest is served by challenges to the validity 
of patents . "It is as important to the public 
that competition should not be repressed by 
worthless patents, as that the patentee of a 
really valuable invention should be protected in 
his monopoly; ... " Pope Manufacturing Co. v. 
Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892). In Lear, Inc. 
v. Adkins , 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969), we wrote : 
"A patent , in the last analysis, simply 
represents a legal conclusion reached by the 
Patent Off ice. Moreover , .the legal 
conclusion is predicated on factors as to 
.,J ' .......... 
- --2-
which reasonable men can differ widely. Yet 
the Patent Office is often obliged to reach 
its decision in an ex parte proceeding, 
without the aid of the arguments which could 
be advanced by parties interested in proving 
patent invalidity ..•. " 
There may well be a limited number of cases in 
which the infringer, although ultimately 
unsuccessful in litigation, may have been 
sufficiently justified in its conduct to make it 
appropriate for the District Court to deny 
prejudgment interest ." 
If you can incorporate this thought in your 
opinicn, without necessarily adopting my suggested 
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It is my understanding that, before 1946, courts disallowed 
interest on infringer's profits or reasonable royalties damages 
until judgment was liquidated, so long as the defense was in good 
faith and not reckless. See Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass 
Co., 298 U.S. 448 (1936). The Court there held that, in the absence 
of "exceptional circumstances," interest on such a judgment does not 
start until the date damages are liquidated. From the Duplate 
facts, it was clear that "exceptional circumstances" could not exist 
in the absence of a finding the deft acted in bad faith or was reck-
less. JUSTICE STEVENS is trying to move back in part to Duplate. 
Section 284, at issue here, states that the court "shall" award 
"damages adequate to compensate for the infringement." Damages must 
not be less that "a reasonable royalty" with "interest and costs as 
fixed by the court." It thus seems clear from the face of the stat-
ute that Congress in 1946 meant to change the existing law as to 
interest on unliquidated infringement damages. The fairest reading 
of the statute is that interest should be treated like costs: they 
are by rule awarded with the amount fixed by the court. The legis-
lative history, if anything, supports the contention that the award 
of prejudgent interest is mandatory. In any case, discretion was 
J 
( - - 2. 
greatly limited. The policy arguments are strongly in favor of pre-
judgment interest in this area of the law. 
JUSTICE STEVENS would reduce the effect of the 1946 amendments 
by making it merely a presumption that the court will award prejudg-
ment interest in the ordinary case. I do not think, however, that 
"the nature of the patent and the strength of the defendant's chal-
lenge" are at all relevant to the limited exercise of discretion 
that the court has not to award prejudgment interest. While patent 
litigation may serve the public interest (and I agree with him on 
this point), prejudgment interest does not "repress" it beyond the 
point that the litigation should be discouraged. Special circum-
stances, such as those identified by JUSTICE STEVENS, are germane to 
a penalty award, but not to "adequate compensation" for appropria-
tion of pltf's property. Interest from the date of breach is an 
essential ingredient of adequate compensation. 
It is a safe assumption that corporate infringers put the money 
that they otherwise would pay in royalties to some use. The issue 
in this case, then, is simply who should get the earnings of that 
money. It makes little sense to give the patent owner the money, 
but not the earnings. More important, the failure to award interest 
not only discourages amicable licensing of patents, but it encour-
ages infringers, even those operating in good faith, to continue 
fighting lawsuits, long after the justification for doing so is ob-
viously gone. I do not think public policy demands that patent own-
ers subsidize their challegers' lawsuits. 
I would not join JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion. 
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From: Justice Stevens 
-•::;, 
; 
C1r0Ulated: fliW 1 2 'B!J -~....,, 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
Beoiroulated: _____ _ 
The 1946 amendments to the patent laws replaced the Duplate 
standard with a presumption favoring the award of prejudgment 
interest in the ordinary case. As the Court correctly holds, 
however, §284 does not automatically require an "award of 
prejudgment interest whenever infringement is found." Ante, at 
8. In exercising its discretion to deny such interest in 
appropriate cases, the trial court may properly take into account 
the nature of the patent and the strength of the defendant's 
challenge. 
In other contexts we have noted the public function served 
by patent litigation. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 
(1969), Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, explained: 
~ 
"A patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a 
legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office. 
Moreover, the legal conclusion is predicated on factors 
as to which reasonable men can differ widely. Yet the 
Patent Office is often obliged to reach its decision in 
an ex parte proceeding, without the aid of the 
arguments which could be advanced by parties interested 
in proving patent invalidity." 
Hence, a patent challenge in the courts permits a more informed 
\, 
.• 
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decision regarding the merits of a particular patent. And, as we 
have long recognized, "It is as important to the public that 
competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that 
the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected 
in his monopoly; ... " Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormally, 144 
U.S. 244, 234 (1892). 
Of course, the general public interest in patent litigation 
does not justify denial of prejudgment interest in the typical 
case in which infringement is found. Wisely today the Court does 
not attempt to define precisely the category of cases in which an 
infringer, although ultimately unsuccessful in litigation, may 
have been sufficiently justified in its challenge to a particular 
patent to make it appropriate for the District Court to exercise 
its discretion to deny prejudgment interest. But the existence 
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